When multiple followers are involved in a bilevel decision problem, the leader's decision will be affected, not only by the reactions of these followers, but also by the relationships among these followers. One of the popular situations within this framework is where these followers are uncooperatively making decisions while having cross reference of decision information. This situation is called a referential-uncooperative situation in this paper. The well-known Kuhn-Tucker approach has been successfully applied to a oneleader-and-one-follower linear bilevel decision problem. This paper extends this approach to deal with the above-mentioned linear referential-uncooperative bilevel multifollower decision problem. The paper first presents a decision model for this problem. It then proposes an extended Kuhn-Tucker approach to solve this problem. Finally, a numeric example illustrates the application of the proposed Kuhn-Tucker approach.
Introduction
In a bilevel programming (BLP) problem, the leader cannot completely control his/her follower but is influenced by the reaction of his/her follower. Such a situation is appearing in decision making of many decentralized organizations. BLP was motivated by the game theory of Von Stackelberg [1] in the context of unbalanced economic 2 markets [2] . The majority of research on BLP has centered on the linear version of the problem in which only one follower is involved. There have been nearly two dozen algorithms, such as, the K th best approach [3, 4] , Kuhn-Tucker approach [5] [6] [7] , complementarity pivot approach [8] , penalty function approach [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] , proposed for solving linear BLP problems since the field being caught the attention of researchers in the mid-1970s. Kuhn-Tucker approach has been proven to be a valuable analysis tool with a wide range of successful applications for linear BLP [2, 6, 7, [14] [15] [16] .
Although much research has been carried out in the area, the existing bilevel technology has mainly limited to a specific situation comparing one leader and one follower.
However, in a real-world bilevel decision problem, the lower level of a bilevel decision may involve multiple decision units. For example, the dean of a faculty is the leader, and all the heads of departments in the faculty are the followers in making a faculty annual budget. The leader (the dean, for example)'s decision will be affected, not only by the reactions of the multiple followers (these heads of departments in the faculty), but also by the relationships among these followers. Each of the leader's possible decisions is influenced by the various reactions of his/her followers who may have had a share in decision information, objectives and constraints. Hence, a bilevel multi-follower (BLMF) decision problem is a common case in any organizational decision practice, and involves various different decision situations.
Our previous work [17] [18] [19] [20] presented overcame some fundamental deficiency of existing linear BLP theory. Based on that, we have recently generalized a framework for BLMF decision problems, and identified nine main kinds of relationships amongst these followers [21] . The uncooperative model is the most popular situation for BLMF decision problems. This model handles the case in which there is no shared decision variable among the followers. Under this uncooperative model, the most basic situation is that any follower also doesn't make any reference to other followers' decision. For a model and related approaches in finding an optimal solution for this particular decision situation, the reader is referred to [21] [22] [23] . Another such uncooperative situation is that though these followers are uncooperative (no sharing of decision variables) but have cross reference of information by considering other followers' decision results in each of their own decision 3 objective and constraint. We call this case as a referential-uncooperative situation, and this paper will particularly focus on this situation.
Following the introduction, this paper proposes a model for linear BLMF decision making in a referential-uncooperative situation in Section 2. An extended Kuhn-Tucker approach for solving this model is presented in Section 3. A numeric example for this approach is illustrated in Section 4. Further remarks are concluded in Section 5. 
The linear BLMF decision model in a referential-uncooperative situation
:
, a linear BLMF decision problem where ) 2 ( K followers are involved and there are not shared decision variables, but shared information in objective functions and constraint functions among the followers is defined as follows: is compact in R (the Heine-Borel theorem) [24] . Corresponding to (1), we give following basic definition.
Definition 2
(a) Constraint region:
The constraint region refers to all possible combinations of choices that the leader and followers may make.
(b) Projection of S onto the leader's decision space:
The feasible region for each follower is affected by the leader's choice of x , and the allowable choices of each follower are the elements of
where
. The followers observe the leader's action and simultaneously react by selecting i y from their feasible set to minimize their objective functions.
(e) Inducible region:
Thus in terms of the above notations, (1) can be written as
We propose the following theorem to characterize the condition under which there is an optimal solution for (1).
Theorem 1 If
S is nonempty and compact, there exists an optimal solution for a linear BLMFP problem.
Proof: Since
S is nonempty, there exist a point
. Then, we have
by Definition 2(b). Consequently, we have
by Definition 2(c). Because S is compact and Definition
. Therefore, we have
by Definition 2(e). Because we are minimizing a linear function
, which is nonempty and bounded, an optimal solution to the linear BLMFP problem must exist. So the proof is completed.
An extended Kuhn-Tucker approach
Let write a linear programming (LP) as follows.
where c is an n-dimensional row vector, b an m-dimensional column vector, A an n m matrix with n m  , and 
Proof: (See reference [2] PP. 59-60)
be the dual variables associated with constraints ) (
respectively, where
We have a following theorem. 
Proof:
(1) Let us get an explicit expression of (2).
Rewrite (2) as follows:
We have
, by Definition 2(e). Then, we have
, by Definition 2(d). We rewrite it as:
, by Definition 2(c). Consequently, we can have
by Definition 2(a).
This simple transformation has shown that solving the linear BLMFP (1) is equivalent to solving (4a-f).
(2) Necessity is obvious from (4a-f). 
. Let us define: 
,
. Thus simplify it, we can have (7 c) where
Now we see that * i y is the optimal solution of (7) which is a LP problem. By Proposition 1, there exists vector Thus we have  )  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , , (
satisfy (8a-n). Our proof is completed.
Theorem 2 means that the most direct approach to solving (1a-d) is to solve the equivalent mathematical program given in (7a-c). One advantage that it offers is that it allows for a more robust model to be solved without introducing any new computational difficulties.
A numeric example Example 1
Consider a following linear BLMF problem with Case 6:  )  0  ,  2  ,  0  ,  0  ,  2  ,  0  ,  0  ,  0  ,  2  ,  0  ,  0  ,  0  (  )  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  (   31  32  31  31  21  22  21  21  11  12  11 
Using the simplex algorithm [2] , we found that a solution occurs at the point 
Further remark
Different relationships among followers in a BLMF decision problem could cause multiple different processes for deriving an optimal solution for the upper level's decision making. The referential-uncooperative situation is one of the popular cases in BLMF decision practices. For solving such a BLMF decision problem, this paper extended the Kuhn-Tucker approach from dealing with one leader and one follower to dealing with referential-uncooperative multiple followers. This paper further illustrated the details of the proposed approach by a numeric example. Initial experiment results showed this new extended approach more effectively for solving the proposed BLMF decision problem. Like most really powerful ideas, the basic notion of Nash equilibrium is very simple, even obvious. Its mathematical extensions and implications are not, however. The idea of this natural "sticking point" is that no single player can benefit from unilaterally changing his or her move -a non-cooperative best-response equilibrium [25] . As a future research, we are going to explore how use this concept into our BLMF research. Some practical use of this extended algorithm also will be considered as our future research task for BLMF decision making in the referential-uncooperative situation.
